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RECENT LEGISLATION
FUTURE

INTERESTS-RULE

AGAINST

PERPETUITIES-RECENT

STATUTORY

AMENDMENT IN NEW YoRK-After 128 years of criticism and confusion1 and
enormous amounts of litigation,2 New York has amended its statutory rule
against perpetuities. The old rule provided that the absolute power of
alienation could not be suspended for longer, than "two lives in being"
at the creation of the estate plus a minority exception in some cases.3
Under the new rule the absolute power of alienation can be suspended
for a period measured by any number of "lives in being" at the creation
of the estate so long as they are not "so designated or so numerous as
to make proof of their end unreasonably difficult." There is, however, still
no period in gross provided for in the New York statutes. N.Y. Sess. Laws
1958 (McKinney) chapters 152 and 153.
This recent statutory amendment makes no primary change in New
York's statutory rule against perpetuities other than to extend the permissible period during which the power of alienation may be suspended,4
or within which a contingent future interest must vest.5 Therefore, the
new amendment will not change New York's definition of the suspension
of the power of alienation, 6 nor the concurrent requirement of vesting
which has been read into the New York statutes.7 By extending the permissible period the new amendment will nevertheless give some needed
relief from the harsh effects of the old "two lives" rule. A specific example
of this type relief is found in connection with the statutory spendthrift
trust. Since the equitable interests in most active trusts are made inalien-

1 "The Statutes of the State of New York Concerning Perpetuities and Related Mat•
ters," SECOND ANNUAL REPORT OF THE LAW REVISION COMMISSION, NEW YORK LEGISLATIVE
DOCUMENT (No. 65 H) 489 (1936); GRAY, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES, 3d ed., §§747750 (1915).
2 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY §25.16 (1952); 6 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 50 (1931); GRAY,
THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES, 3d ed., §§750, 871 (1915).
349 N.Y. Consol. Laws (McKinney, 1945) §42; 40 N.Y. Consol. Laws (McKinney,
1949) §11. Although the personal property statute refers to "suspension of absolute ownership" it would seem that this term is as broad as "suspension of the absolute power
of alienation." See SIMES, FUTURE INTERESTS §121 (1951).
4See 28 MICH. ST. B. J. 17 (March 1949); 49 YALE L. J. 1112 (1940).
Ii Matter of Wilcox, 194 N.Y. 288, 87 N.E. 497 (1909). See 49 YALE L. J. 1112 (1940),
22 HAR.v. L. REv. 520 (1909); 49 Consol. Laws (McKinney, 1945) §§46, 50; 40 N.Y. Consol.
Laws (McKinney, 1949) §11. The common law rule, unlike the New York rule, is directed
only against remoteness of vesting. GRAY, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES, 4th ed., §191
(1942).
6 See SIMES AND SMITH, FUTURE INTERESTS §1418 (1956), for a definition of suspension
of the power of alienation.
7 Thus certain shifting or springing executory interests which are alienable will still
be invalid under the new rule unless limited to vest within "lives in being"' at the
creation of the estate. Walker v. Marcellus and Otisco Lake Railway Co., 226 N.Y. 347,
123 N.E. 736 (1919). See SIMES, FUTURE INTERESTS §122 (1951).
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able by statute in New York,8 these trusts are void when they are so
limited that they might continue beyond the permissible period.9 Thus
a statutory spendthrift trust for the joint benefit of three or more living
persons to continue until the death of the survivor was void under the
old "two lives" rule.10 Under the new rule, however, such a trust will be
valid because it must end within "lives in being." A power of appointment may now be limited to be executed within "lives in being," computed from the creation of the power,11 and a trust, contingent interest,
or sub-power created by a power will be void only when it may suspend
the power of alienation beyond, or may not vest within, "lives in being"
at the creation of the power.12 Since the validity of a limitation is normally
determined as of the inception of the instrument creating it,13 it would seem
that the old rule will probably still apply to all trusts, amendable or not,
created prior to the effective date of the new act.14
As the amendment extends only the permissible period allowed under
the old rule,15 it follows that the prior decisions and statutes which have
absolutely exempted certain interests from the statutory rule against
perpetuities are still good law. In this respect the branch of the New York
rule against remoteness of vesting will not apply to such interests as an
option to purchase land, a possibility of reverter, or a power of termination even though these interests could be classified as contingent.16 Further,
as the old New York rule against perpetuities, like the common law rule,
was normally not applied to charitable trusts,17 the new rule will make
little change in this area.18 Since a New York statute provides that a

s 49 N.Y. Consol. Laws (McKinney, 1945) §§96, 103; 40 N.Y. Consol. Laws (McKinney,
1949) §15. Not all trusts suspend the power of alienation, however. See 26 ST. JoHN's L.
REv. 247 (1955); 49 N.Y. Consol. Laws (McKinney, 1945) §ll8; 40 N.Y. Consol. Laws
(McKinney, 1949) §23; Robert v. Corning, 89 N.Y. 225 (1882).
9 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY §25.6 (1952). Perhaps the New York legislature never
contemplated such a result. See 19 MICH. L. REv. 235 (1921).
10 Fowler v. Ingersoll, 127 N.Y. 472, 28 N.E. 471 (1891). See 4 PROPERTY REsTATEMENT
2676, Appx., c. A (1944); 5 ST. JoHN's L. REV. 1 (1930).
1149 N.Y. Consol. Laws (McKinney, 1945) §178. See 6 AMERICAN LAw OF PROPERTY
§25.19 (1952). However, the power of alienation is not suspended if a general power
presently exercisable to appoint a fee is involved. It would therefore seem that in this
case the period will be counted from the' exercise of the power.
1249 N.Y. Consol. Laws (McKinney, 1945) §179. See 6 AMERICAN LAw OF PROPERTY
§25.19 (1952); WALSH, FUTURE ESTATES IN NEW YORK §27 (1931).
13 See 49 N.Y. Consol. Laws (McKinney, 1945), annotation following §42.
14 LooKER, "The 1958 Modification of the New York Rule Against Perpetuities,'' THE
IRVING LAWYERS LETTER (1958). The effective date of the new amendment was September I,
1958.
15 See note 4 supra.
16 Matter of City of New York, 246 N.Y. 1, at 30, 157 N.E. 911 (1927); Leonard v.
Burr, 18 N.Y. 96 (1858). See SIMES AND SMITH, FUTURE INTERESTS §1418 (1956).
17 Matter of Crespi, 158 Misc. 383, 285 N.Y.S. 780 (1936); Matter of MacDowell, 217
N.Y. 454, ll2 N.E. 177 (1916); 49 N.Y. Consol. Laws (McKinney, 1945) §113; 40 N.Y.
Consol. Laws (McKinney, 1949) §12. See WALSH, FUTURE ESTATES IN NEW YORK §32 (1931).
18 The only exception being a gift to a charity on a remote contingency not preceded
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direction for accumulations for a longer term than the minority of the
beneficiaries is void as to the time beyond the minority,19 the amendment
will make no change in the permissible duration of trusts for accumulations.20 The new rule also makes no change in the law of successive legal
life estates. A section of the New York real property law prohibits successive legal life estates from being limited to persons not in being at the
creation thereof, and provides that where a remainder is limited on more
than two successive life estates all the life estates subsequent to the two
persons first entitled thereto shall be void.21 As this section applies to all
legal life estates it could invalidate a vested remainder in a life estate
which does not suspend the power of alienation.22
From the scope of the amendment it would seem that there will be no
effect on any of the prior decisions as to the proper construction of instruments affected by the statutory rule against perpetuities. UnfortunateJy, however, the interpretative problems created by this amendment
cannot be so easily disposed of. Feeling that the operation of the "two
lives" rule was extremely harsh in a number of instances, the New York
courts developed several constructional fictions to circumvent its harsh
effect.23 Though not in accord with the weight of common law authority
on proper methods of construction,24 these fictions became firmly established
as the law in New York.25 A common example of a constructional fiction
was the tendency to treat limitations as separable. Thus where a settlor
created a trust to pay the income to B, C, and D, for life and upon the
death of each to pay a proportionate part of the corpus to his issue or to
others, this was treated as three trusts so as not to violate the "two lives"
rule.26 Such separability has been extended to less obvious situations.21

by a prior gift to a charity which was formerly invalid unless bound to vest within
"two lives" in being, is now valid if limited by "lives in being." See SIMES AND SMITH,
FUTURE INTERESTS §1417 (1956).
19 49 N.Y. Consol. Laws (McKinney, 1945) §61; 40 N.Y. Consol. Laws (McKinney,
1949) §16.
20 However, if an accumulation is directed to commence subsequent to the creation
of the estate out of which the rents and profits or income are to arise it may now commence within lives in being, rather than two lives in being as required under the former
rule, subject to the rule of restrictive minority. Ibid.
2149 N.Y. Consol. Laws (McKinney, 1945) §43.
22 Purdy v. Hayt, 92 N.Y. 446 (1883); 49 N.Y. Consol. Laws (McKinney, 1945), annotation following §43.
23 See note 1 supra.
24 SIMES, FUTURE INTERESTS, Part 4 (1951).
25 34 CORN. L.Q. 270 (1948).
26 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY §25.24 (1952).
21 Matter of Horner, 237 N.Y. 489, 143 N.E. 655 (1924); 26 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 245
(1952). Also, where a settler created an inter vivas trust to endure for two lives and then
disposed of his reversion for two additional lives, the courts may have held both trusts
good. It looks, however, like the power of alienation had been suspended for four lives.
See 23 N.Y. UNIV. L.Q. REv. 785 (1948). In testing the validity of trusts of personal prop-
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Since these constructional fictions were adopted to avoid the harsh
effect of the "two lives" rule it would seem to follow that they will be
abandoned under the recent amendment,28 and that the New York courts
will return to the common law methods of construction. Inasmuch as
these constructional fictions are firmly established by stare decisis in
New York as the proper construction of instruments in relation to the
perpetuity statutes, however, this result may not follow as easily as some
writers have assumed. 29 The New York courts will, therefore, undoubtedly
have to deal with a number of specific cases before the effect of the amendment on these constructional fictions is finally settled. In addition to this
interpretative problem there are other problems arising under New York's
perpetuity law which are not reached by the amendment. As there is still
no period in gross provided for in the New York rule, a statutory spendthrift trust for a flat term of years, for instance, is still void.30 It logically
follows that since the power of alienation can be suspended for many
lives in being it should also be suspendable for a given priod of time.31
It likewise seems illogical that a future interest limited on a contingency in
which no lives are involved should be void when the contingency is bound
to occur within a reasonable period in gross.s2
Despite these problems which the amendment either creates or leaves
unsolved, there is definite improvement in the New York statutory scheme.33
One of its best features is that the "lives in being" measure conforms to
the perpetuity statutes of most other states as well as to the common law,
making it easier to find precedents which will assist lawyers and judges
in construing legal documents. As only two of the several states which
once followed the old New York measure have retained the "two life"
permissible period,34 this statute is in accord with a trend toward a return
to the common law period of "lives in being."35

Paul K. Gaston, S.Ed.

erty the New York courts were able to avoid the "two lives" rule by applying out-of-state
law where either: (1) the trust was created in another jurisdiction to be administered
in New York, or (2) the trust was created by a New York domiciliary to be administered
elsewhere. See 29 Sr. JoHN's L. REv. 247 (1955).
28 See 43
29 Ibid.

CORN. L.Q. 703 (1958).

30 Haynes v. Sherman, 117 N.Y. 433, 22 N.E. 938 (1889). See 50 CoL. L. REv. 225 (1950).
31 See 49 YALE L. J. 1112 (1940).
32 SIMES, PUBLIC POLICY AND THE DEAD HAND (The Thomas M. Cooley Lectures, 6th
series) 69 (1955).
33 E.g., it no longer discriminates against testators with more than two children.
34 Minn. Stat. Ann. (1947) §500.13; Ariz. Rev. Stat. (1956) §§33-261, 33-262.
35 See 29 Sr. JOHN'S L. REv. 247 (1955); 38 CoRN. L. Q. 543 (1953); 46 HARV. L. REv.
701 (1933).

